Gemeinschaftsgüter: Recht, Politik und Ökonomie

Preprints
aus der Max-Planck-Projektgruppe
Recht der Gemeinschaftsgüter
Bonn
2000/5

Litigation and environmental protection
in the European Union

von
Rachel A. Cichowski
Litigation and environmental protection in the European Union

Rachel A. Cichowski

März 2000
Rachel A. Cichowski

Litigation and environmental protection in the European Union

ABSTRACT  This paper examines how the European Court of Justice (ECJ) has operated to expand the integration project and has done so by serving as a forum for transnational political action by domestic and supranational policy actors. In particular, I study this integrative dynamic through the evolution of environmental protection policy in the European Union (EU). The purpose of this analysis is to reveal how the Court's construction of supranational norms operates to fuel the integration process, and often in opposition to national government preferences. The data presented in this analysis pertains to Article 234 (ex Article 177) of the Treaty of Rome. By studying this process, I am able to reveal not only the role of the Court in constructing European environmental rules, but the integral role that both national judges and private litigants play in deepening integration. This study focuses specifically on the environment policy sector, yet provides a general framework for examining the case law in subsequent policy areas, with the purpose of providing a more nuanced understanding of European integration.

1 Rachel A. Cichowski, Department of Political Science, University of California, Irvine, CA 92697-5100, tel. 949.824.5361, FAX 949.824.8762, rcichows@uci.edu

2 I use the term EU consistently throughout this paper to refer to both present day institutions and activities, and also those occurring prior to the Treaty of European Union (1991) under the auspices of the European Community.

3 An earlier version of this paper appeared in the Journal of European Public Policy (see Cichowski 1998).
In the last forty years, we have witnessed the evolution of an unprecedented form of supranational governance in western Europe. The European Court of Justice has played a powerful role in this transformation. The Court’s activism in the 1970s is now widely accepted as having transformed the Treaty of Rome, an international treaty governing nation-state economic cooperation, into a ‘supranational constitution’ granting rights to individual citizens (Lenaerts 1990; Mancini 1991; Stone 1995; Stone Sweet and Brunell 1998a; Weiler 1981; 1991). The Treaty of Rome stands today as the backbone of a supranational legal regime governing not only transnational free trade issues, but domestic environmental protection standards. The ECJ’s role in this transformation poses a unique puzzle for scholars and policy experts engaged in questions of European policy integration. Can nation-states retain full control over supranational policy outcomes once they construct and empower supranational institutions? The answer remains the subject of serious contention between scholars and practitioners interested in understanding the impact of the ECJ on European integration.

This study is of particular interest to scholars and practitioners examining European policy-making as it reveals new avenues and arenas for citizen participation in this process. The recommendations in this study are consistent with recent studies demonstrating and promoting the powerful role that both supranational institutions and transnational actors have in the integration project (Alter 1996; Burley and Mattli 1993; Cichowski 1998; Mattli and Slaughter; Stone Sweet and Brunell 1998a; 1998b; Stone Sweet and Caporaso 1998). Furthermore, environmental protection presents an interesting test case. This sector reveals the unintended consequences of ambiguous or lowest common denominator European policy positions and also the inherent conflicts between “new” EU policy areas and the internal market. Process tracing enables me to test not only the impact of national government policy positions on the Court’s judicial decisions, but also the effect that private citizens and national courts have on European policy integration. The Article 234 (ex Article 177)4 procedure allows (and in some cases requires) national judges to ask the ECJ for a correct interpretation of EU law if it is material to the resolution of a dispute being heard in a national court. Scholars and policy experts alike now recognize the importance of this procedure, as it was primarily through the Court’s Article 234 case law that the Treaty was “constitutionalized.” Furthermore, Community wide awareness of this procedure has also escalated as Article 234 references now comprise the majority of the Court’s case load (Stone Sweet and Brunell 1998a).

This paper contributes to a growing body of scholarship that strives to create a more nuanced understanding of both European integration and the larger processes of international policy-making (e.g. Sandholtz and Stone Sweet, eds. 1998; Stone Sweet, Sandholtz and Fligstein, eds. forthcoming). In particular, this study demonstrates how the ECJ operates to expand the integration project by serving as a forum for transnational political action by domestic and supranational policy actors. I study this integrative dynamic through the evolution of environmental protection in the European Union. My purpose is two fold. First, I will examine the evolution of the Court’s Article 234 case law in this

---

4 Article 177 will be referred to by its new numbering, Article 234, throughout the rest of this manuscript.
policy sector focusing on outcomes. In particular, I will evaluate whether the policy positions of national governments have significantly impacted the Court’s decisions. Second, I will examine the extent to which the tensions embodied in EU environmental policy have facilitated a dynamic relationship between the Court, private litigants (including interest groups) and national courts, leading to the expansion of supranational policy competence. Specifically, I am interested in determining the extent to which this judicial rule-making, the Court’s authoritative interpretation of Community law, may operate outside the reach of national government control.

**Policy Context and Theoretical Perspectives**

The following section develops a set of hypotheses which will guide the empirical analysis presented in this paper. First, I will review the state of environmental policy in the European Union, bringing attention to the two main tensions characterizing this policy sector. In the second part, I review the current theories of legal integration in order to highlight their main issues of contention regarding the Court’s role in European policy integration. From this examination, I develop a set of testable hypotheses derived from a modified neo-functional theory.

**EU Environmental Policy**

Despite an enthusiasm for a European wide environmental protection plan, EU environmental policy poses a challenge to the goals of the single market and the varying national environmental goals (Vogel 1993). Because of this consideration, EU environmental policy has embodied a set of conflicting tensions:

1. the development of EU environmental protection standards versus the preservation of free trade policies; and
2. the creation of unified Community environmental standards versus preserving a member state government’s national environmental standards.

Stated simply the tensions involve competing European policy priorities (developing environmental protection or preserving internal market policies), and the ultimate location of policy-making competence (either at the national or supranational level).

The first tension is typified by the conflicts which arise when the transposition of an EU environmental law, such as one to establish a waste disposal scheme, creates a barrier to those individuals, such as waste collectors, who transport their goods across member state 5  

---

5 See Demiray 1994, p.73 for a more detailed discussion of these tensions.
borders. An example of the second tension, is the conflict which arises when a member state, such as the Netherlands, implements an EU wildlife protection law in a more strict manner compared to other member states. While the EU law allows such strict national interpretations, ultimately the policy competence is shifted to the supranational level as conflicts arise from these varying national transpositions.

The origins of EU environmental policy are not traceable to a rule set out in the Treaty of Rome. The original three treaties lacked any mention of the "environment," an unsurprising fact, as ecological sensibilities were not commonplace in 1957. However, with a growing awareness of environmental degradation in the 1970s, member state governments realized there was a need to safeguard the environment at the European level. As a result, through a series of directives and programs, environmental protection emerged as a policy area for the Community despite the absence of a constitutional basis. The tension between supranational and national policy competence was evident in these initial policy debates. Environmental directives and regulations required unanimous approval in the Council and as a result, generally included provisions permitting stricter national policy. As a result, the legal basis for Community environmental protection remained weak and ambiguous. Furthermore, this policy area was conceived in economic terms, in which the need for supranational environmental policy was evaluated in terms of the functioning of the common market. However, these policy decisions failed to resolve the inherent conflict that would arise between stricter environmental protection standards and the Community’s goal to remove barriers to free trade (Demiray 1994). As we will later see, this absence of a resolution in Community legislation does not inhibit, but rather provokes, the Court to construct a balance through its judicial decisions.

With the adoption of the Single European Act (SEA) in 1987, the Community amended the Treaty to include environmental protection: Title VII- Articles 130r through 130t and Article 100a (now Articles 174-176 and Article 95 under the Treaty of Amsterdam). The SEA also introduced qualified majority voting pertaining to the harmonization of national laws and established the structure for qualified majority voting within the Environmental Title (yet this remained merely a structure as Title VII still required unanimity voting).

The Maastricht Treaty in 1991 did not fundamentally change the SEA's environmental provisions, but instead re-emphasized their importance. The Treaty directs that environmental concerns "must be integrated into the definition and implementation of the Community's other policies" (Article 174, ex Article 130r). In addition, the Maastricht Treaty requires that "Community policy on the environment shall aim at a high level of protection" (Article 174, ex Article 130r). Thus, these amendments did little to solve the supranational and national policy competence conflict and instead, reaffirmed the tension. Title VII illustrates the EU’s strive for community wide environmental policy but at the same time preserves national government authority over environmental protection (as evidenced by Articles 95 (4), ex 100a(4), and 176, ex 130t).6

---

6 These Treaty provisions emphasized environmental protection while de-emphasizing free trade. However, their use has been minimal.
Finally, the Amsterdam Treaty in 1997, introduced the codecision procedure in the area of environmental protection. This had the effect of further aligning Article 175 (ex Article 130s) with Article 95 (ex Article 100a), although the unanimity clause is still applicable to some areas. However, generally these changes strengthened the legal basis for Community environmental protection. The Amsterdam Treaty also added the concept of "sustainable development" into Community law. Scholars have argued that this formal inclusion "signals the commitment to ensure a prudent use of natural resources in order to take the environmental and economic interests of future generations, as those of the present ones, into account" (Krämer 1999, p.7). The vague definition of sustainable development laid out in the Treaty, perhaps embodies a Community ideal, yet falls short on providing precise legal instruments to implement this goal.

Today the European Union had adopted over 200 pieces of secondary legislation involving environmental protection. While this is a positive step towards the creation of a comprehensive EU environmental program, the implementation of and commitment to such laws remains fragmented across member states (Chalmers 1999). Vague policy prescriptions and lowest common denominator policy decisions have enabled member state governments to interpret and implement these policies in accordance with their own national policy goals. Furthermore, it has also sometimes led to the non-enforcement of these transposed rules. The empirical analysis in this paper examines the unintended consequences of this ambiguity and the Court’s impact on these outcomes.

Theories of Legal Integration

The theoretical debates surrounding European legal integration provide us with general expectations of how the Court functions to construct European policy through judicial rule-making. From these theories, I will develop a set of hypotheses pertaining to the conflicting pressures embedded in EU environmental policy. In particular, these hypotheses predict the general pattern of Article 234 environmental litigation and the factors affecting the Court’s judicial decisions.

The importance of the ECJ in the integration project is widely known and accepted by scholars, yet the dynamic surrounding the Court’s activism remains contentious. The theoretical debates focus on who controlled this process and specifically, what role have the Court, transnational society and the member state governments played in integrating European policy sectors? Did ECJ judicial decisions consistently embody the policy positions of member state governments or did the judicial outcomes reflect an independent integrative dynamic driven by the Court acting together with private litigants and national judges? These questions are answered quite differently by neo-functionalists and intergovernmentalists. Their central points of contention revolve around institutional autonomy and the impact of member state government preferences.

Mattli and Slaughter (formerly Burley) argue that the EU’s supranational legal system results from a dynamic interaction between supranational and national judges and litigators (Burley and Mattli 1993; Mattli and Slaughter 1995). They claim that the "primary
mechanism” expanding European law is the Court’s ability to co-opt national judges and lawyers. This interaction creates a “community of actors above and below the state” which drives the integration project forward (Mattli and Slaughter 1995: 186). They assert that this dynamic operates autonomously from national government control to the extent that the Court has created a legal system which is often not in their interests. Furthermore, they argue that the Court acted autonomously throughout the construction of the European legal system. This is evidenced by the Court systematically ruling in opposition to member state government interests while constraining their ability to retaliate against these adverse rulings (Mattli and Slaughter 1995). These propositions are consistent with a neo-functional model of integration.

Similarly, Stone Sweet provides empirical evidence of the importance of transnational actors and the autonomy of the ECJ in the construction of the European legal system (Stone Sweet and Brunell 1998a; Stone Sweet and Caporaso 1998). His theoretical model is generally consistent with the modified neo-functional theory developed by Stone Sweet and Sandholtz (1997). The theory predicts integration in terms of three independent factors: transnational exchange; transnational litigation; and the production of Euro-rules. As the scope of European legislation widens, the avenues for transnational exchange are expanded. This expansion has led to an increase in legal disputes and ultimately provided the basis and opportunity for judicial rule-making. Together these variables introduce an integrative dynamic which explains integration in terms of the autonomy of the Court, and the importance of national courts and private litigants in the integration project (see Stone Sweet and Brunell 1998a). In particular, this model is helpful in explaining the pattern of environmental litigation as it deals directly with the repercussions and conflicts which arise from the expansion of Community policy.

On the issue of autonomy, intergovernmentalists paint a considerably different picture of legal integration. Garrett argues that although the ECJ may seem to be acting against member state government interests, its jurisprudence actually reflects the preferences of powerful member state governments (Garrett 1995; Garrett, Kelemen and Schultz 1998). Furthermore, Garrett argues that one can not reject intergovernmental accounts of European legal integration when powerful member state governments protest, but then subsequently accept ECJ decisions. Garrett offers no systematic evidence to support his conclusions, yet explains this outcome in terms of the “broader benefits” a member state gains through integration (Garrett 1995: 180). Similarly, Moravcsik argues that the ECJ’s autonomy is most accurately understood in terms of its relationship as an agent of the member state governments (Moravcsik 1995; 1998). His framework evaluates autonomy not in terms of the Court acting independently, but instead evaluates how far the ECJ can extend the reigns of constraint that bind it to the member state governments. He acknowledges that the ECJ possesses considerable power, yet maintains that this power (or ability to act “autonomously”) is “explicitly or implicitly” delegated by member state governments and thus can be retracted (Moravcsik 1995: 625).

The significance of member state government preferences is implicit in the above discussion of ECJ autonomy. Neo-functionalists generally argue that the interests of member state governments, while integral to the integration project, do not consistently constrain the
Burley and Mattli (1993) argue that the Court utilizes European law as both a "mask and a shield" to enable the Court to advance its own agenda. While the Court is subjected to the constraints imposed by the EU legal doctrine and legal reasoning, it utilizes these constraints to help hide and protect its integrative activism. Furthermore, Stone Sweet empirically demonstrates that national government preferences are not the significant factor driving the legal integration project (Stone Sweet and Brunell 1998a; Stone Sweet and Caporaso 1998). One must look to litigation generated by transnational society and the structure of European law to understand this integrative dynamic. Stone Sweet provides evidence that the Court consistently "functions not to codify the preferences of dominant member states, but to construct transnational society" (Stone Sweet and Caporaso 1998: 42).

Intergovernmentalists argue that the Court's case law serves to codify the policy preferences of the dominant member state governments. This is implicit (if not explicit) in the principal-agent frameworks they use. Garrett finds that the "decisions of the European Court are consistent with the preferences of France and Germany" and if they were not, the member state governments would have diminished the Court's power and reconstructed the European legal system (Garrett 1992: 556-559). These national preferences present a significant, if not dominant, position in an intergovernmentalist explanation of legal integration.

Predicting Environmental Preliminary References and Rulings

These opposing understandings of European legal integration provide a set of testable hypotheses upon which we can study the Article 234 process. This analysis will utilize a set of hypotheses derived from a modified neo-functional theory to predict the dynamic governing Article 234 environmental litigation. The following expectations are an elaboration of previous research generated from this theory (see Cichowski 1998; Stone Sweet and Brunell 1998; Stone Sweet and Caporaso 1998). In particular, I am concerned with how the Court and transnational society reacts to the inherent tensions in this policy area. I utilize variables emphasized by this theory, that of transnational society, both exchange and litigation, and the Court's autonomous law-making capacity. I expect the litigation to generally follow a predictable pattern:

---

7 For the sake of brevity, the theoretical basis for these hypotheses will not be further elaborated in this paper. Please see Stone Sweet and Brunell (1998a) for a detailed explanation of the factors underpinning this theory.
(1) Litigation will involve national environmental laws which present an obstruction to free trade. These include both national and EU environmental protection laws;

(2) I would also expect references to attack national environmental norms which enshrine least integrative positions in comparison to other member states (either weaker or more stringent implementations);

(3) Finally, in the absence of a legal framework for balancing free trade and environmental priorities, I would expect the ECJ to construct a balance for the Community when presented with a conflict. In constructing this supranational framework, I would also expect the Court to dismantle inconsistent national policy when given the opportunity and in general, rule more favorably towards supranational laws which already embody integrative norms.

Generally, I expect the interaction between litigants, national courts, and the ECJ to enable the Court to further develop European environmental policy through its judicial rule-making function. Consistent with a modified neo-functional theory, I would also generally expect this dynamic to operate independent of member state government preferences and so often in opposition to these preferences. As evidenced in previous research, the ambiguity and fragmentation inherent in EU policy has triggered a dynamic of litigation which has inevitably empowered both private litigants (including interest groups) and the ECJ (Stone Sweet and Brunell 1998a; Stone Sweet and Caporaso 1998). The Court has functioned to resolve these ambiguities and in doing so has shifted the authority over certain national policies away from member state government control. The following analysis of the environmental protection sector will allow us to empirically test this dynamic against the assumptions of intergovernmentalists.

Methodology

The data utilized in this analysis includes all Article 234 environmental litigation from 1976 (the first case) to 1998. The Article 234 procedure, as mentioned earlier, involves the ECJ clarifying the compatibility of a national law with European law. The national court sends a ‘reference,’ a question or set of questions, asking for an interpretation of EU law, often in reference to its transposition into national legislation. Formally, Article 234 does not enable the ECJ to directly rule on the compatibility of national rules with EU law. However, the practical reality of the ECJ’s interpretation of EU law, in a context determined by national legislation, is often a determination of the validity of these national laws (see de la Mare 8

These data are taken from a larger set which includes all of the references from 1961 to mid 1998 (see Stone Sweet and Brunell 1998a; 1998b).
The ECJ’s response is delivered in the form of a ‘preliminary ruling’ and must be applied by the national judge to resolve the dispute. Integral to this procedure are ‘observations,’ which are written briefs filed by the Commission and the member state governments (regardless of whether the case originates in their legal system) stating how they believe the case should be decided (or more generally how the EU law should be interpreted).

I coded the data in the following manner. The references were all coded by country of origin and EU law pertaining to the case. After examining all of the Court’s judgments included in the time period of this study, I coded the rulings into two categories:

1. either the Court had accepted a national rule or practice as consistent with EU law; or
2. it was declared to be inconsistent with EU law.

The written observations were also coded into two categories:

1. either an observation was successful, or
2. unsuccessful at predicting the ECJ’s final ruling.

For example, consider a case involving the compatibility of a French environmental law; if the British government filed an observation stating the French law was compatible with EU law and the ECJ ruled that it was incompatible, then the British observation would be coded as unsuccessful. The first measure gives us a general picture of whether the Court functions to preserve national policies or develop supranational policy. And together these two measures reveal the impact of member state government preferences on ECJ rulings.

I am also interested in how the outcomes of ECJ rulings differed when the litigation involved national laws, nationally implemented (or transposed) EU laws and both EU environmental and free trade laws. The environmental Article 234 cases followed three patterns. The ECJ is asked to decide whether:

1. a national environmental law is compatible with an EU environmental law;
2. a member state government’s implementation of an EU environmental law is compatible with the intentions of European environmental policy;
3. a member state government’s implementation of an environmental EU law is compatible with EU free trade laws.

Each case is coded in terms of one of these outcomes. This will give us an indication of whether the ECJ favors the development of European laws over national laws. This analysis will also reveal which member state governments are being targeted by environmental litigation. Important questions will be raised: Are their environmental laws too strict or too weak in comparison to the European norms they are meant to enshrine? Or are their domestic environmental practices barriers to free trade?
Data Analysis

Table 1 details the EU laws which were invoked in these preliminary reference cases. This gives us a general picture of which laws are being subjected to litigation over time. The majority of cases pertain to the Waste Framework Directives (Council Directives 75/442 and later amended by 91/156), the Wild Bird Directive (Council Directive 79/409), and free movement articles of the Treaty (Articles 28, 29, 30 ex 30, 34, 36). This pattern of litigation is not surprising. While waste management has stood as a considerable priority for Community legislators, the Waste Framework Directives offered a general rather than specific definition of waste (the results of unanimity voting) which led to inconsistent transpositions and introduced uneven burdens on competition (Chalmers 1994). Generally, litigants attacked the domestic transpositions of these directives to the extent that these rules served to obstruct free trade. This ambiguous definition of waste also in effect led to varying national interpretations of what constituted waste. The litigants in these cases demanded a clarification of these European rules and in effect initiated the progressive development of European waste policy.

The Wild Bird Directive (Council Directive 79/409) introduces a similar dynamic. The birds protected under this directive are clearly defined, but the directive allows a stricter implementation by individual governments (a compromise which was essential for a unanimous vote). Member state governments implementing a strict version of this directive were often simultaneously constructing barriers to free trade. These countries were then subjected to litigation which led to the clarification of the European law. The balance between environmental and free trade priorities remains ambiguous at the Community level and such directives have given the Court the opportunity to develop a case law which constructs such a framework. Environmental interest groups have exploited the ambiguities in this directive to force stricter protection laws in legal systems which possess weak interpretations of the directive.9

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>EU Environmental Laws</th>
<th>Total References</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Dangerous Substances</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CD 67/548</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CD 79/831</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CD 79/117</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CD 76/769</td>
<td>2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CR 3093/94</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total</td>
<td>6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Environmental Impact Assessment and Consumer Information</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CD 85/337</td>
<td>4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CD 90/313</td>
<td>2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total</td>
<td>6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Nature Conservation</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CD 79/409</td>
<td>6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total</td>
<td>6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Noise Pollution</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CD 80/51</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CD 83/206</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total</td>
<td>2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Waste</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CD 75/442</td>
<td>13</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CD 75/439</td>
<td>4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CD 76/403</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CD 78/319</td>
<td>3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CD 91/156</td>
<td>31</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CD 91/689</td>
<td>7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CR 259/93</td>
<td>11</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total</td>
<td>70</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Water</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CD 76/464</td>
<td>3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CD 78/659</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CD 80/778</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total</td>
<td>5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Other EU Laws</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Article 28-30 ex 30-36 (free movement of goods)</td>
<td>9</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Article 98 ex 102a (eco. and monetary policy)</td>
<td>5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1968 Convention on Jurisdiction</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Fishing Interim Measures</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CR 554/81, 1569/81, 1719/80, 2527/80,</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3305/80, 1171/79, 2897/79, 541/80</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Note: Total References column denotes the number of times an EU Law is invoked in Article 234 Proceedings. CD= Council Directive  CR= Council Regulation  
Source: Data provided by the European Court of Justice.
Table 2 provides a general picture of how this litigation has developed cross nationally and by the EU laws invoked in the cases. This demonstrates not only which countries are receiving the bulk of the litigation, but which EU laws are continuously the subject of litigation. Immediately, one is drawn to the numbers associated with Italian Article 234 references involving the EU waste directives. 60 percent of all references involved the waste directives and out of these 80 percent originated from Italian Courts. These cases were the subject of criminal proceedings brought against individuals involved with the management, treatment and disposal of waste. The Italian government has been criticized for its delinquent implementation of EU waste laws (Guittieres and Sikabonyi 1997). These criticisms were largely a result of the Italian government’s failure to bring into force a series of waste management proposals. Furthermore, there were significant conflicts embedded in these proposals over enforcement responsibilities (federal versus Italian regional authorities). This litigation asked for a clarification that was currently lacking in both the EU waste directives and the Italian interpretation of these laws.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>Total Reference</th>
<th>Env. Assess./Informatio</th>
<th>Dangerous Substan-</th>
<th>Nature</th>
<th>Noise</th>
<th>Waste</th>
<th>Water</th>
<th>Other</th>
<th>Free Move</th>
<th>ment Goods</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Belgium</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>1</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Denmark</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>1</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>France</td>
<td>10</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>3</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Germany</td>
<td>6</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>1</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Italy</td>
<td>50</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>43</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>1</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Netherlands</td>
<td>15</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>3</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Sweden</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>1</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>United Kingdom</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>1</td>
<td></td>
<td>1</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>2</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Source: Data provided by the European Court of Justice.
Have ECJ rulings generally preserved national laws, or do these decisions favor the construction of supranational norms? Table 3 provides an overview of the Article 234 reference pattern by the Court’s rulings. I find that clearly the bulk of these cases, 87 percent, are divided between questions asking the Court to decide on the compatibility of a national environmental law with a European law or whether an environmental directive was transposed correctly. These data also reveal a Court that does not hesitate to dismantle national laws when given the opportunity. In cases where a national law was in question (18), the Court found the national practice to be inconsistent with European law in 72 percent of these cases. The data also reveal that the Court is far less likely to alter a transposed directive than an original national law. In cases where the Court is asked whether a transposed directive is compatible with a European law (15), the Court finds these transpositions inconsistent in only 13 percent of these cases. The Court was asked in five cases to balance EU environmental protection and free trade norms, and in 60 percent of these cases the Court rules in a direction which favors free trade laws. These data reveal a Court which has generally looked skeptically at national environmental protection, and more favorably toward integrative Community free trade priorities.

**TABLE 3  PATTERN OF ENVIRONMENTAL PRELIMINARY REFERENCES BY JUDICIAL OUTCOME, 1976-1998**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Reference Pattern</th>
<th>Nat. environmental law vs. EU law</th>
<th>Transposition of directive</th>
<th>EU environmental law* vs. EU free trade law</th>
<th>Total cases</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Judicial Outcome</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Inconsistent with EU law</td>
<td>13</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>18</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Consistent with EU law</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>13</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>20</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total cases</td>
<td>18</td>
<td>15</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>38</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

* The judicial outcome for these cases is read as either “Inconsistent with EU free trade law” or “Consistent with EU free trade law.”

Source: Data compiled from the European Court Reports.

Between 1976 and 1998, the ECJ made 38 environmental preliminary rulings. From the data in Table 4, we can see that of these decisions, the Court declared violations (the national practice was inconsistent with EU law) in 19 (50%) of the cases. The ECJ considered the lawfulness of French practices in 10 rulings, declaring violations in 4 (40%). Aggregating results from litigation involving “powerful member state governments” (France, Germany, Italy and the UK), the Court declared violations in 12 (48%) of the decisions. These data
give some preliminary indication that those national legal regimes that enshrine the least
integrative rules will be attacked by references. Together France and Italy received over half
of all the litigation in this policy sector. This is not surprising. France has historically
favored inter-governmental cooperation rather than an integrative Community policy on the
environment and thus its administrative practices embody this non-integrative position
(Demiray 1994). Similarly, while Italy tends to agree to rather strict Community measures in
the Council, they do so with the intention that they will not have to fully implement the EU
laws (Rehbiner and Stewart 1985). This pattern also holds when looking at legal systems
which possess stricter environmental laws. Almost one quarter of the references attacked
Dutch laws as a result of strict environmental codes which cause obstructions to free trade.
These data confirm the hypothesis that litigants will attack national legislation that function
as hindrances to free trade. Also, to the extent that a member state possesses least
integrative environmental norms (weaker or stronger implementations of EU laws), I find
that these legal systems are subjected to Article 234 litigation.

**Table 4 Judicial Outcomes Pursuant to Preliminary References in the Environmental Policy Area, 1976-1998**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>Consistent with EU Law</th>
<th>Inconsistent with EU Law</th>
<th>Total</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Belgium</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Denmark</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>France</td>
<td>6</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>10</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Germany</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Italy</td>
<td>6</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>11</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Netherlands</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>8</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>United Kingdom</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Total</strong></td>
<td><strong>19</strong></td>
<td><strong>19</strong></td>
<td><strong>38</strong></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

*Note: Outcomes were coded as 'consistent' if the ECJ declares the national rule or practice as consistent with EU law, and 'inconsistent' if the ECJ declares the rule or practice to be inconsistent with or in violation of EU law. Formally, Article 234 does not enable the ECJ to directly rule on the compatibility of national rules with EU law. However, the practical reality of the ECJ’s interpretation of EU law, in a context determined by national legislation, is often a determination of the validity of these national laws. See de la Mare (1999).*

Source: Data compiled from the **European Court Reports**.

The findings also reveal that the Commission's observations predicted ECJ rulings far better
than did observations filed by member state governments. The data presented in Table 5
reveal that the Commission's success rate is 97 percent as 37 observations predict the
direction of the final ruling. The United Kingdom's rate of success was much lower in
comparison at 27 percent. Similarly, French preferences only predict ECJ judicial decisions 45 percent of the time. It is interesting to note that while Italy’s success rate is high (70%), in 3 of its observations the Italian Government actually filed an observation which stated it believed their national law was inconsistent with EU law (government preferences in all other cases take a stance to defend or preserve national law) and the ECJ concurred. In general, the findings presented in Table 4 and 5 bring into question claims that the preferences of the most powerful member state governments constrain the Court in a systematic manner. The findings are also congruent with the view that the ECJ’s judicial rule-making clarifies EU competence and in doing so expands the integration project.

**TABLE 5  MEMBER STATE GOVERNMENT OBSERVATIONS AND JUDICIAL OUTCOMES PURSUANT TO PRELIMINARY RULINGS IN THE ENVIRONMENTAL POLICY AREA, 1976-1998**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>Successful</th>
<th>Unsuccessful</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Belgium</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Denmark</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>France</td>
<td>9</td>
<td>11</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Germany</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Italy</td>
<td>7</td>
<td>3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Netherlands</td>
<td>7</td>
<td>3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>United Kingdom</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>8</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>The European Commission</td>
<td>37</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Note: Observations were coded as 'successful' when their argument, to the effect that the national rule is consistent or inconsistent with EU law, agrees with the ECJ ruling. And 'unsuccessful' when their argument, to the effect that the national rule is consistent or inconsistent with EU law, disagrees with the ECJ ruling.

Source: Data compiled from the European Court Reports.

**Process Tracing**

These data reinforce theoretical predictions which argue that the preferences of powerful member state governments do not generally constrain the Court’s judicial outcomes. The patterns of environmental references and the subsequent judicial rulings reveal the Court’s active participation in the integration project. These data gave us a general picture of the dynamic driving this litigation. To understand more precisely how this litigation developed and how the Court addresses the two tensions inherent in this policy sector, I rely on the content of the case law. In the first set of cases, the Court balances two policy priorities: environmental protection and free trade. The second set of cases examines how the Court rules when confronted with a conflict between supranational and national policy competence.
Environmental Protection vs. Free Trade Policy

The Court first dealt with the tension between environmental and free trade priorities in the *Inter-Huiles* case.\(^{10}\) The plaintiffs in the case, a group of 14 French waste oil collectors, brought an action before a French Tribunal charging that another group of waste collectors was operating in violation of the French law implementing Council Directive 75/439. This waste oil provision allows national authorities to create zones for the disposal of waste. The defendant countered these charges by claiming that the French waste collection system presented a restriction to the import and export of waste oil. The Court concurred and ruled that the French law, which prohibited the export of waste oils to a disposal center authorized by another member state government, violated the free movement of goods provision of the Treaty. The Court reaffirmed the Community's commitment to environmental protection, but warned "such a right does not automatically authorize the governments of the Member States to establish barriers to exports" (Paragraph 11). The Court upheld free trade rules by stating that the French scheme was over burdensome to accomplish the stated environmental goals of the directive. This case typifies a series of waste rulings in which the Court systematically dismantles national environmental regulations which create an obstruction to transnational exchange.\(^{11}\)

However, a subsequent ruling reveals a Court that will not blindly dismantle all environmental regulations which come in conflict with free movement priorities. Instead the Court develops a proportionality test for balancing these decisions. Even before the SEA, the ECJ ruling in the *ADBHU* case\(^ {12}\) held that the protection of the environment was "one of the Community's essential objectives" which may justify certain limitations of the free movement of goods principle provided they do not "go beyond the inevitable restrictions which are justified by the pursuit of the objective of environmental protection" (Paragraph 13 and 15). The case involved an action brought by the French Public Prosecutor against an association which defends the interests of manufacturers, dealers and users of stoves and heaters utilizing fuel oil and waste oil. The association was charged with promoting the burning of waste oil, an objective which was argued to be contrary to the French law which transposed Council Directive 75/439. The association objected and argued that this waste oil disposal scheme obstructed the basic meaning enshrined in the principles of freedom of trade, free movement of goods and freedom of competition.

The Court reaffirmed the importance of the free movement principles, and declared that the directive must be interpreted in "light of those principles." However, the ECJ revealed that these principles could be limited by others. The test can be stated as: (1) for environmental protection to obstruct the free movement of goods, it must constitute a fundamental Community goal ---a requisite the ECJ had no problem finding;\(^ {13}\) and (2) that the principles

---


13 The ECJ found that "the directive must be seen in the perspective of environmental protection, which is one of the Community's essential objectives...." (Paragraph 13).
of proportionality and non-discrimination are observed, if restrictions of free movement are necessary. Similar to the Inter-Huiles case, the ECJ re-emphasized that the directive was not intended to obstruct intra-Community trade, however it did allow for the creation of a zoning system whose goals could not otherwise be achieved. The Court ruled in favor of the French zonal system, and found that to the extent it did restrict trade, it was not discriminatory nor went "beyond the inevitable restrictions which are justified by the pursuit of the objective of environmental protection" (Paragraph 15). This case reveals that the ECJ will permit restrictions on intra-Community trade that are non-discriminatory, narrowly tailored and proportional to the goal sought.

The ruling in ADBHU reveals the Court's calculated incorporation of environmental priorities into a supranational context, even before this was decided by member state governments, and at the same time re-emphasized free movement priorities. In paragraph 12 of the judgment, the ECJ observed "that the principle of freedom of trade is not to be viewed in absolute terms but is subject to certain limits justified by the objectives of general interest pursued by the Community provided that the rights in question are not substantively impaired." The last part of this wording seems to imply environmental interests are important, yet remain of secondary importance. Furthermore, scholars have also observed that this ruling emphasized the superiority of free trade norms, even when more strict environmental regulations are needed or desired by a member state (see Jans 1995). As earlier mentioned, the original waste directives were vague provisions. The Court did not hesitate to clarify these provisions and in doing so progressively expanded EU competence in this policy area.

The Court continues this line of expansive rulings in a reference which targets a national environmental law possessing stricter standards of bird protection than the regulations found in other member states. The Court's position is exemplified in a case originating in the Netherlands, Gourmetterie Van den Burg.\(^\text{14}\) The reference originated from a Dutch appellate court in which the plaintiff was appealing the charge that he had wrongfully imported a bird species which was protected by the Dutch law implementing Council Directive 79/409. The plaintiff argued that the Dutch interpretation of the EU law presented an obstruction to the free movement of goods. Since Article 14 of the directive permits stricter implementation, the legal question revolved more particularly around whether the Netherlands' preventing the importation and consumption of a wild bird, a grouse, lawfully hunted in the United Kingdom was simply too strict. In short, the ECJ ruled that a member state government cannot extend its laws to protect species falling outside the concerns of the directive and particularly when that species fell within another member's territory. While the directive originally allowed for the stricter implementation of environmental protection, the Court does not hesitate to amend this right if it infringes too deeply on free trade.

National vs. Supranational Policy Competence

The previous cases dealt with environmental issues in a free trade context and revealed the Court dismantling national obstructions to the free movement of goods. These cases also illustrated that the Court operates to balance environmental protection and trade issues, while replacing national laws. The following cases examine how the Court rules when confronted with a conflict between supranational and national policy competence. While this tension is also prevalent in the first set of cases, Court's participation in expanding supranational policy competence is revealed more clearly in the references which pertain solely to the tension between national (this includes transpositions of EU law) and EU environmental policies.

Handelskwekerij GJ Bier v. Mines de Potasses d'Alsace\(^\text{15}\) presents an ECJ ruling which has had considerable influence on future environmental litigation in the Community. This case brings into question the issue of jurisdiction in environmental litigation. The case involves the 1968 Brussels Convention on Jurisdiction and Enforcement of Judgments in Civil and Commercial Matters and the 1971 Protocol governing its interpretation by the ECJ. Article 5(3) of the Brussels Convention confers jurisdiction in matters "relating to tort, delict or quasi-delict" on the courts of the place "where the harmful event occurred." By way of an Article 234 reference from the Appellate Court of the Hague, the ECJ was asked to interpret the "where the harmful event occurred" clause. The defendant in the case allegedly discharged 10,000 tons of chloride every twenty-four hours into the Rhein River. The ECJ ruled that Article 5(3) "must be understood as being intended to cover both the place where the damage occurred and the place of the event giving rise to it" (Paragraph 24).

This progressive interpretation of Article 5(3) not only reversed the original Dutch court decision, it expanded the jurisdiction intended by the Brussels Convention. This ruling enables victims of transboundary pollution to choose the jurisdiction in which they want to bring tort; either in the country in which the damage was suffered or the country in which the event giving rise to the damage occurred. As member state governments possess varying rules regarding right of standing, environmental protection, legal costs and time delays, legal scholars argue that this ECJ ruling allows the possibility of forum shopping for interest groups wishing to bring proceedings against polluters (Sands 1990).\(^\text{16}\) The Court’s ruling clarified supranational rules and in doing so diminished member state government control over environmental policy decisions.\(^\text{17}\)

The final case included in this study provides an understanding of the Court's current position and most aggressive role in positive integration in the area of environmental policy. The ECJ has progressively developed and continues to expand the scope of the main waste

---


\(^\text{16}\) The ECJ has since clarified its interpretation of eligibility on long-arm jurisdiction stating that it is only available to victims of direct harm (See Sands 1990).

\(^\text{17}\) While torts are not (directly) aimed at government policy, rather the behavior of private parties, judicial rulings can have the effect of changing the national rules governing behavior more generally.
directives: Council Directive 75/442 and Council Directive 78/319. In the Zanetti cases, an Italian Magistrates Court asked the ECJ to decide whether "waste" as defined by Directive 75/442 included reusable materials. The case involved the prosecution of road haulers, who were transporting used hydrochloric acid for reuse in the production of ferric chloride. They were transporting the material without permission from the regional administration. The Italian waste disposal system resulted from implementation of the waste directives. And it included mandatory authorization to transport waste. While agreeing that the substance was hazardous, the defendants claimed it was not waste, as they had no intention of abandoning it, and therefore they could not be prosecuted under the Italian law. The Court did not concur. Instead, the ECJ found that "substances and objects which are capable of economic re-utilization" are included within the meaning of waste as defined in Article 1 of Directive 75/442 (Paragraph 13). The significance of this ruling lies in the Court’s expansive definition of "waste" which now widens the jurisdiction of materials subject to EU environmental law.

Rulings such as the Zanetti case will be welcomed by environmental interest groups as it widens the scope of material subjected to EU regulation. Groups are given a new legal basis to pursue stricter environmental protection through national courts. Scholars agree that the Zanetti cases indicate that the ECJ will not shrink from taking a wide and purposive approach to the interpretation of EU environmental legislation, even when the outcome is costly for member state governments (Sands 1990; Chalmers 1994). This case also exemplifies how directives possessing vague rules will inevitably be subjected to litigation and the Court’s progressive rulings. The Court shifts the policy authority away from member state governments regardless of the national costs that may occur due to the ruling. Yet, this ruling did not offer a final resolution to the conflicts arising from the EU waste directives and Italian practices, instead it is was merely the beginning.

Since 1987, Italian national courts have sent 43 references to the European Court of Justice asking for a clarification of these European waste laws. As earlier mentioned, these Italian references compose virtually half of all references in the area of the environment. The original Waste Framework directive, 75/442, was an attempt by the Community to construct a system of integrated waste management. Yet as the Zanetti cases demonstrated, this system was highly problematic as it lacked a uniform definition of waste. In particular, it revealed the tension between the question of what is a "waste" and what is a "good." The Zanetti rulings represented the Court’s first attempt to resolve this conflict by expanding and clarifying the concept of waste in Community law. Subsequently, Community legislators amended the original Framework directive and adopted Council Directive 91/156 which borrowed the Court’s expansive definition of waste. While the materials that now fall under Community management have been greatly expanded, clarity to the original waste/good conflict still persists. This tension led to the subsequent Italian cases involving 91/156. The Court is subsequently given the opportunity to and is asked to bring greater clarity to Community waste laws. Overall, scholars have argued that this cycle of litigation continues to expand the scope of Community competence in waste management, and the remaining

ambiguities around the concept of waste will elicit further litigation and clarification in the policy sector (Cheyne and Purdue 1995; Purdue 1998; Van Calster 1998; Van Rossem 1998).

Overall, the case law in this analysis reveals that the Court has yet to develop a concrete analytic framework for dealing with integration of the economic market and environmental protection. However, this Article 234 analysis offers evidence that the Court will take quite seriously arguments which push for stronger environmental protection, but will still weigh them against the overall influence this protection has on the free movement of goods. Generally, the Court does not hesitate to shift the control over environmental protection away from national competence even when a decision is costly to member state governments. The Article 234 process in general and the behavior of the Court in particular has operated in a predictable pattern. The expansive logic of the Court has created an integrative dynamic. Ultimately, this judicial rule-making dynamic has diminished member state government control in the area of environmental protection, including its relation to economic priorities, while simultaneously preferencing national judges, transnational actors, and supranational institutions.

Conclusions

The European Court of Justice acts to fuel the European integration process. The judicial outcomes and case law of the Court in the policy area of environmental protection reveal this dynamic. Litigants are continually asking national judges to evaluate domestic policies in terms of supranational law. The relationship between national courts and the ECJ leads to the creation of new European rules. This construction of supranational policy ultimately undermines national control over particular policy decisions. The Article 234 case law fuels this expansive process, as we see national legal systems whose laws are now not in conformity with these new European laws subject to litigation until their national laws are shifted upward. Testing a modified neo-functional model against the claims of intergovernmentalists, I find that the empirical evidence supports the former.

The environmental Article 234 litigation in this analysis illustrates this dynamic. First, litigants disproportionately target national environmental laws which obstruct transnational activity. The Court is systematically being asked to void national environmental regulations in favor of European free trade priorities. The Court responded in two ways, both of which expanded supranational authority. Judicial rulings either actively dismantled national environmental regulations which presented a clear obstruction to free trade; or the rulings led to the construction of a supranational legal framework to balance environmental protection and economic interests. The tension between environmental protection and free trade remains unresolved in secondary legislation, yet the Court acting together with private litigants and national courts did not hesitate to construct such a balance. Second, the case
law reveal that member states possessing weak or strict implementations of EU law became the target of references.

Third, the Court rules in a direction which requires national legal systems to amend domestic law in a direction that ensures the expansive development of supranational environmental norms. EU environmental policy embodies a tension between national and supranational environmental protection goals, yet when the ECJ is confronted with this conflict through the preliminary ruling procedure, the Court generally shifts the policy authority away from member state governments. The ECJ's interpretation and expansive reconstruction of the waste directives provides a clear example of this. Finally, this analysis has revealed that time and time again, the ECJ is clearly informed of the preferences of powerful member state governments, and does not hesitate to act in opposition to these interests. These preferences can not explain the expansive logic which characterizes the Court's behavior.

This paper provides empirical evidence that brings into question claims that national governments can completely control international policy outcomes. Furthermore, this study serves to bring to the forefront of regional integration discussions interactions between transnational actors, national judges and the European Court of Justice. These relationships serve to construct a legal framework that opens the door to those who have been traditionally closed out of EU decision-making. It also provides a new arena for individuals, who have exhausted domestic legal routes, to challenge or participate in contentious national debates. Individuals, environmental lawyers and environmental interest groups have become integral components in the process of European integration. I would expect both individuals and interest groups to increasingly utilize the ECJ as their transnational strength is multiplied through this litigation process. These societal actors may not be actively pursuing European integration per se, but as the expansive dynamic predicts, the unintended consequences of their actions have a direct impact on the construction of supranational policy and the deepening of integration.

---

19 Both the subsidiarity principle and also the creation of a more critical Court of First Instance, especially on procedural matters, may present a balance for (or constraint on) this judicial activism more generally in the area of environmental protection.
References


